

The European Union's contracts with Moderna

A business model with socialised risk and privatised profit

by Peter F. Mayer*



Peter F. Mayer
(Picture www.tkp.at)

(CH-S) Whilst footballers are dragged into the public spotlight and condemned without being asked, it takes a great deal of perseverance to bring to light facts that are far more significant to the public than the behaviour of footballers.

It seems that this approach is also intended to make it clear to every last citizen that absolute obedience will be required in the event of the next pandemic. – The following article outlines the European Commission's approach in connection with the authorisation of the Covid vaccines.

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In response to a parliamentary question from the Austrian Freedom Party MEP Gerald Hauser, the European Commission confirms that investments were made "before it was certain whether the vaccines in question would be successful" – and that, at the same time, the manufacturers' liability risks were passed on to the member states. The risk was socialised; the profit privatised.

The written question E-002576/2026 from MEP Gerald Hauser (P/E) to the Commission has been answered¹ – and the answers "are quite something", as Hauser puts it. The crux of the question: the contract between the Commission and Moderna dated 4 December 2020 (SANTE/2020/C3/054 – SI2.838958), signed by Moderna CEO Stéphane Bancel and the then EU Health Commissioner Stella Kyriakides.

In it, the signatories acknowledged that, due to the "accelerated timelines" for the development, production and supply of the mRNA vaccine, Moderna could under no circumstances guaran-



Moderna's share price soared in 2021, the year the largely untested Covid 'vaccine' was granted market authorisation. (Picture <https://finment.com>)

tee or accept any liability for the vaccine being sufficiently effective or free from "unacceptable side effects".

The result: Moderna was exempted from any liability for vaccine-related harm – including death, physical, mental or psychological injury, illness or disability, fear of injury, loss of property and even business interruption suffered by a vaccinated person. The Member States assumed these risks – as was also the case with the BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine.

Hauser's three questions – and the explosive answers

Hauser put three questions to the Commission:

- Why did the Commission accept the risk that Moderna's gene-based vaccine might be ineffective and have "unacceptable side effects"?
- Why was Moderna exempted from any liability for vaccine-related harm?
- Did the Commission also know as early as 2019 that a pandemic would occur in 2020?

As the FPÖ notes in its analysis,² the answers are highly explosive.

On the crucial issue of investment and liability, Hauser quotes from the Commission's official response: the investments had "indeed taken place before it was certain whether the vaccines in question would be successful".

At the same time, the Member States were prepared to "reduce the risks associated with liability for adverse effects for the manufacturers" to create sufficient incentives for market entry.

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Risk socialised, profit privatised

Hauser's conclusion: "In plain language, this means: the risk was socialised, whilst sales were pushed! This is not a normal business risk. The public shouldered the risks so that pharmaceutical companies would have an incentive to enter the market as quickly as possible."

This documents precisely what critics have been saying for years: the COVID-19 vaccination campaign was an extremely lucrative business model for the pharmaceutical industry, in which the commercial risk – which is normally borne by every manufacturer – was passed on entirely to taxpayers.

A normal company that brings a product to market is liable for any damage caused. It is precisely this liability that constitutes the market-based mechanism which ensures quality and safety. It is precisely this mechanism that was systematically undermined in this case.

The question of prior knowledge: Bancel and the year 2019

Hauser's third question is particularly noteworthy. The background to this consists of statements by *Moderna* CEO *Stéphane Bancel*, according to whom his company had already been preparing in 2019 for a pandemic in 2020 and the production of billions of vaccine doses.

Bancel had stated this publicly – including at the *World Economic Forum*, as reported by TKP.³ According to this, Moderna had already produced 100,000 vaccine doses in 2019.

The European Commission's response to this is as revealing as it is evasive: it did not address these statements in any detail and merely claimed that – unlike Bancel or Moderna – it had not been aware that a pandemic would occur in 2020.

It should be noted, however, that the European Commission had previously admitted to conducting its own pandemic simulation exercise in 2019.⁴

Conversely, this means that the Commission does not even deny that Moderna knew. It merely denies its own prior knowledge, which is apparently also highly questionable. A remarkable situation.

The unanswered questions – Hauser intends to dig deeper

Hauser announces that he will not let the matter rest: "Why were such contractual terms accepted? Who decided that the public should bear the risks? And why was this system kept so tightly under wraps? That is what I intend to find out next by submitting a further question to the European Commission. Billions in taxpayers' money are at stake, as are liability issues and, ultimately, the health of citizens. The public has a right to know who made these decisions and who actually benefited from them."

Conclusion

What this document amounts to is an official admission of the structural conditions under which the COVID-19 vaccines were procured:

- Investments were made before efficacy had been proven;
- There was no liability whatsoever – neither for ineffectiveness nor for "unacceptable side effects";
- The risk was borne by the public, the profit by the pharmaceutical industry.

Thus, the crucial question is no longer whether the COVID vaccination campaign was designed as a business model to benefit the industry – but who made these decisions and who actually benefited from them.

The answers to these questions are still pending. But the direction in which Gerald Hauser is digging is likely to become increasingly uncomfortable for those in charge in Brussels.

Source: <https://tkp.at/2026/09/07/eu-kommission-gibt-zu-covid-spritzen-ein-geschaeftsmodell-mit-sozialisiertem-risiko-und-privatisiertem-gewinn>, 7 September 2026

(Translation "Swiss Standpoint")

¹ https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-10-2026-002576_DE.pdf

² <https://www.fpoe.eu/hauser-eu-kommission-machte-covid-19-impfungen-zum-maximal-eintraeglichen-geschaeftsmodell>

³ <https://tkp.at/2023/03/07/moderna-ceo-wir-haben-2019-schon-100-000-impf-dosen-erzeugt>

⁴ <https://tkp.at/2025/08/21/eu-kommission-gibt-eigenes-pandemie-planspiel-im-jahr-2019-zu>